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ABSTRACT








The most appropriate methodology suitable for scientific investigation and research has been an issue of controversy among scholars, scientists and as well as philosophers of science. Ideologically, scholars are divided on the most appropriate methodology for determining empirical (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Empirical" \o "Empirical​) truth. Broadly categorized, the critical divide has been between inductive and deductive methodologies.
Recent trends in philosophy of science discourse revolve around the problem of methodology of scientific inquiry, the factors that could enhance the advancement of science, the question of truth and certainty as well as the issue of rationality of scientific discoveries. More fundamental in this discourse is the methodological problem of scientific research. In fact, a number of ideologies have emerged in response to the challenges posed by the issue of methodology of science.

The relativists, for instance, see scientific truth in terms of a period of reference, environment and orientation. To the realist, a statement in science is either true or false; there is no mid-way between the two. The instrumentalists are rather interested in the function that theories play in science. They see theories as necessary instruments in science, which essentially, are meant to make prediction with precision possible and to offer explanation of events in nature.

Incidentally, Francis Bacon (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Francis_Bacon" \o "Francis Bacon​), Isaac Newton (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Isaac_Newton" \o "Isaac Newton​), and others considered D (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Inductive_reasoning" \o "Inductive reasoning​) the basis of scientific method. By this inductive approach to scientific method, one makes a series of observations and forms a universal generalization (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Generalization" \o "Generalization​). If correct and stated in a sufficiently accurate way, an inductively arrived-at statement relieves others of the need for making so many observations and allows them to instead use the generalization to predict what will happen in specific circumstances in the future.

The logical positivists, on their own, are interested both in the methodology of science as well as the relationship between science and metaphysics. They also thought highly of the principle of inductive procedure as a basis for scientific knowledge. They, however, use their principles of verifiability and confirmabilty to dismiss the propositions of metaphysics as nonsensical, and as having no bearing in the acquisition of knowledge.
Following the logical positivists, David Hume launched an attack on metaphysics which he saw as pure sophistry and illusion. But Hume criticized induction and argued against it as the best model or method of science.  Karl Popper also condemned the inductive model of science and introduced the deductive method which he termed the ‘hypothetico-deductive method of science. 


THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
The term induction is a process or method of reasoning in which the premises of an argument are believed to support the conclusion. It is the method of inferring general theories or laws from particular instances that have been observed. According to Kemeny, (1959, 93) induction is the “process by which the scientist forms theory to explain the observed facts, it is a reasoning drawn from the past to the future in the expectation that the future will continue to behave in the same manner as in the past”. What this simply implies is that the fact that the sun rises every morning to the best of our knowledge in the past gives us the cause to believe that it will rise in such a way in the future.
It is pertinent to mention that induction presupposes certain basic assumptions:
1.	that there is a necessary connection between one event and another, that is, between a cause and its effect.
2.	that nature is uniform and behaves the same way anywhere and at all times.
3.	that the future will be like the past, and that what happened in the past will also happen in the future.
4.	that what we have observed to be the case in many instances will be the case in all instances. 

Aristotle (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Aristotle" \o "Aristotle​) was first to establish the mental process of inductive-deductive method as a class of reasoning. He views scientific inquiry as a progression from observation to generalizations and back to observations. To Aristotle, explanatory principles sould be induced from observations. Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon both affirm Aristotle’s inductive-deductive model of scientific method. Crombie(1953: 52) notes that Grosseteste refers to the inductive stage as a ‘resolution’  of phenomena into constituent elements, and to the deductive stage as a ‘composition’ in which these elements are combined to reconstruct the original phenomena.  Losee (1993: 32) also mentions that Grosseteste method of induction specifies an inductive assent from statements about phenomena to elements from which the phenomena may be reconstructed. In his book, The Opus Majus, Roger Bacon (1962: 615) also emphasizes that successful application of this inductive procedure depends on accurate and extensive factual knowledge. To him, the factual base of a science often may be augmented by active experimentation.
In a similar vein, Francis Bacon, regarded as the champion of the inductive-experimental method, also advocates for the inductive process for scientific investigations. Like, Aristotle, Bacon sees science as a progression from observations to general principles and back to observations. However, Bacon criticizes Aristotle’s on the basis that Aristotle’s induction relies on simple enumeration; and secondly that Aristotle reduced science to deductive logic by overemphasizing the deduction of consequences from first principles. To Bacon, deductive arguments are of scientific value only if their premises have proper inductive support. (Losee 1993, 67).
John Stuart Mill also systematized the inductive methods with his formulation of the five canons of induction. Theses include the method of agreement; the method of difference; the joint method of agreement and difference; the method of residues; and the method of concomitant variation. (Copi and Cohen 2006, 455) To Mill, these procedures are means of testing scientific hypotheses. They are the tools with which causal relations may be discovered, and canons with which causal connections may be proved. However, Copi and Cohen (2006) mention “that Mill was wrong on both counts…….. That the methods are indeed of the very greatest importance, their role in science is not so majestic as he supposed.” 
Jevon (1958) also criticizes Mill’s claim that the justification of hypotheses is of inductive schemata.  Jevon emphasizes that in order to show that a hypotheses has consequences that agree with what is observed is to utilize deductive arguments.
In a similar vein, David Hume denies the logical admissibility of inductive reasoning by criticizing the theory of causality. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume articulated his view that  the inductive inference operates on the principle that the past acts as a reliable guide to the future (this is sometimes called the principle of the uniformity of nature).
Although Hume did not use the word induction, but his critical analysis of the principle of causality was in fact a critical analysis of his inductive method.(Omoregbe 1996, 118). For Hume, “every event, whether cause or effect, is utterly distinct and a separate entity. In a word, every effect is a distinct event from its cause” (Hume 1955, 118). 
Hume thus concludes that our inductive practices have no rational foundation, for no form of reason will certify it. To Hume, the assumed necessary connection between a cause and an effect derives from our habit of associating together two things that we have repeatedly seen occurring together in the past. Thus, it is an assumption that there is a necessary connection between them, that the first causes the second.  
POPPER’S ARGUMENT AGAINST INDUCTION
Popper’s contribution to philosophy of science is his attempt to deal with the philosophical problem of induction. Karl popper disputes the existence, necessity and validity of any inductive reasoning. He agrees with Hume that there is a no necessary connection between a cause and an effect, and that we can never draw a logically valid conclusion from some observed cases to all cases. Popper accepts Hume's conclusion that inductive inference is not rationally justifiable. He thus, rejects the principles of induction as “superfluous, and that it must lead to logical inconsistencies”(Popper 1977, 29). The principle, he argues, can lead to infinite regress. Nevertheless, Popper disagrees with Hume’s observation that the assumed necessary connection derives from our habit of seeing two things together in the past. If induction originates from habit, where does habit itself originate from? But while Hume says habit originates from repetition, Popper disagrees and contends that habit is prior to repetition. To popper, habit is already formed before repetition begins. Thus, repetition cannot be the source of habit. Popper contends that habit arises from expectation, prior to repetition. He points out that we naturally expect regularity and uniformity from nature even before we begin to experience repetition. Thus, induction is not based on habit as Hume would have us believe, but on expectation which is then followed by observation. This expectation is already a theory, which means that theory comes before observation, and not the other way round.
ON FALSIFICATION AND CORROBORATION
Popper contends that theories are prior to observation, and they are derived from expectations. Theories are conjectures put forward to be tested by observation, to be falsified or corroborated by observation. Popper explains that a theory can never be confirmed by observation, it can only be corroborated, while the possibility of it been falsified in future remains open. If a theory fails to yield the expected result or if experience negates a theory, and it is falsified then it should be abandoned.
Theories that have not yet been falsified, or those that have been repeatedly corroborated by experience can still be falsified by future experience and observation. Science, according to Popper proceeds by the method of conjectures and refutations, by trial and error. It is not founded on any solid rock. To Popper “the empirical basis of objective science has nothing absolute about it. Science does not rest upon solid ‘bedrock’; on the contrary, it is like a building erected on piles”. (Popper 1959, 11). Popper also contends that “the belief in scientific certainty and in the authority of science is just wishful thinking. Science is fallible because science is human.” (Popper 1945, 375).
Popper admits that modern science has made tremendous progress. To Popper, this progress is not due to the method of induction. He argues that science does not employ the inductive method. Instead, science proceeds by the method of conjectures and refutations, trial and error. Thus, repeated observations and experiments function in science as tests of our conjectures or hypotheses, i.e., as attempted refutations.(Popper 1963, 55). To Popper, a scientific theory is by its nature falsifiable. The more falsifiable a theory is, the more scientific it becomes. 
KARL POPPER’S HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHODOLOGY  
Popper rejects the traditional inductive model in science and replaces it with his own methodology, the ‘hypothetico-deductive methodology’. Popper here reiterates that the methodology actually employed by scientists is not the inductive method but the hypothetico-deductive method.
Popper rejects the traditional inductive model and says that it is not the actual methodology of science. He replaces with what he claims to be the methodology actually used by science. According to Popper, the hypothetico-deductive method begins with a problem, followed by a theory as a tentative explanation or solution to the problem, experimentation or observation is then carried out with a view to falsifying the theory. The theory could then be falsified, refuted and then rejected, or it could be ‘corroborated’ by repeated experiment, in which cases it is accepted and used continuously. Popper insists that observation does not come before theory as it is believe in the traditional inductive methodology. On the contrary, theory comes before observation.(Popper 1963, 46). So, according to Popper, that one can start with pure observation alone without anything in the nature of a theory is meaningless and nonsensical.

In Popper’s methodology, only theoretical systems capable of being refuted by tests are scientific. Such systems are falsifiable by systematic experimentation. Therefore, for Popper, falsifiability and testability mean the same thing, since every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it. Logically, the characterisation of such falsifiable or testable systems involves the attempt to spell out the logical relations holding between a theory and the class of what Popper called ‘basic statements’. (Popper 1959, 100).

A scientific theory is taken to be falsified if there are accepted basic statements which clash with it. Popper argues that if accepted basic statements contradict a theory, then they provide adequate grounds for its falsification only if they corroborate a falsifying hypothesis simultaneously. Thus, the experimental situation in which the scientist finds himself more often than not involves crucial experiments designed to decide between two hypotheses. In so far as these hypotheses differ in some way, the experiment has to corroborate one or the other, and such corroboration is effected when the competing hypotheses are confronted with accepted basic statements. (Anele 1997, 25)

One of Popper’s arguments against the theory of induction is his elaboration of the idea of corroboration. A theory is said to be corroborated so long as it does not contradict the accepted basic statements. To Popper, corroboration means confirmation in the process of testing scientific hypotheses. However, much corroboration is found if a hypotheses is still not conclusively proved true.(Flew  1979, 73). Popper compares two theories in order to find which one has lesser or greater verisimilitude. Popper explains that when two theories for example are corroborated, the theory, which passes lots of tests, is likely to have greater verisimilitude. This implies that the theory, which has greater verisimilitude, has more truth and less falsehood. (Afisi 2003, 104). Popper maintains that a hypothesis which is falsifiable in a higher degree, or the simpler hypotheses, is also the hypothesis which is corroborated to a higher degree. If we have hypotheses A and B as competing theories at a point in time, and we know that B has survived severer tests than A, then B has greater verisimilitude i.e. more truth and less falsehood at that point in time.(Anele 1997, 26)   

Although, Popper is aware that the comparison of two statements or theories in terms of their degrees of corroboration is problematic. He says we can only speak roughly in terms of positive degrees of corroboration, negative degrees of corroboration, and the like.(Popper 1959, 268). This may render corroboration otiose in the logic of science. But Popper’s strategy for preventing that is the articulation of some methodological rules; for instance the rule that a falsified theory should not receive a positive corroboration appraisal.

It is pertinent to pause at this juncture in order to know whether Popper intends to use his idea of inventing theories of higher degrees of corroboration to be used in place of the idea of truth as the aim of science. This is because Popper had variously described the objective of scientific research programmes as “discovery of truth”, “explanation of reality”, “invention of theories of greater verisimilitude” among others. But in the The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he was very skeptical in the use of ‘truth’ to characterize scientific theories.(Kraft 2004, 112). For Popper, the falsificationist methodology does not need the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’.

Although, the concepts of true and false are regular logical concepts among scientists. Both concepts are timeless in the sense that when a statement is true or false, it is true or false forever. This explains the situation when, for instance, a theory which is taken to be true yesterday is now stated to be false today, in the light of new knowledge. What this simply implies is that the theory was true yesterday but became false today because a new discovered knowledge has made it false.

However, the concept of corroboration is essentially different from this. We appraise a statement as corroborated with respect to some system of basic statements, a system accepted up to a particular point in time. In the words of popper:
The corroboration which a theory has received up to yesterday is logically not identical with the corroboration which a theory has received up to today. Thus we must attach a subscript, as it were, to every appraisal of corroboration- a subscript charaterising the system of basic statements to which the corroboration relates(for example, by the date of its acceptance). (Popper 1959, 275)

It is clear from the foregoing that Popper’s idea of corroboration of scientific theories is not the same with the concepts of truth and falsehood of scientific theories usually held by other scientists. This is because the concepts of true and false are free from temporal considerations, in their objective senses. But one and the same theories may have different corroboration values all of which can actually be true at the same time. 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
Going by Popper’s criticism of the inductive model of science one would appreciate his position upon the basis that deductive arguments are usually always rationally and logically true. In deductive logic, for instance:
All human beings are mortal
Socrates is a human being 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal  

The conclusion of this argument is derived logically from the premises. This argument is naturally, rationally, logically and necessarily true. This is as against the example of inductive argument in logic. 

One essential feature of inductive argument is that there is always a ‘gap’ or an inductive leap from the premises to the conclusion of an argument. The conclusion of an inductive argument can only follow from the premises with some degree of probability. For instance:
Cows are mammals and feed their young with milk
Sheep are mammals and feed their young with milk
Dogs are mammals and feed their young with milk
Therefore, all mammals and feed their young with milk

Nevertheless, we cannot categorically affirm that Popper’s hypothetico-deductive methodology successfully solved the problem of induction in science. Popper’s logical asymmetry between verification and falsification, we argue, is fraught with technical errors. The inconsistency in this analysis is that Popper condemns induction with the right hand and embraces it with the left. This asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability result only from the logical form of universal statements but Popper admits that they can also be contradicted by singular statements with the help of modus tollens of classical logic. To Popper, such an argument to the falsity of universal statements is the only strictly deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in the ‘inductive direction’; that is, from singular to universal statements. (Popper 1977, 41). This, we say, is antithetical to Popper’s absolute rejection of the inductive method 

Again, there is no denying the fact that every philosophical enterprise has a metaphysical basis. The inductive model of science is, in fact, a priori. The inductive reasoning constitutes the metaphysical foundation of modern science. The inductive model is supra-empirical in which no empirical investigation or experiment can establish. It is a probability based model of enquiry. Thus, we cannot rule out the traces of inductive processes in empirical science. Contrary to the contention of Hume and Popper, science actually employs the inductive method which is implied even in Popper’s own hypothetico-deductive method. Popper’s admittance of the importance of metaphysics to empirical science relates to his embrace of induction. In his words:
I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. for it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of science there have been others-such as speculative atomism-which have aided it. And looking at the matter from the psycholological angle, I am inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is ‘metaphysical’.

It is clear from the above that induction is implied in Popper’s own hypothetico-deductive method. Even Popper’s falsifiability and corroboration theses are arrived at inductively. It is therefore on this basis that we argue the thesis for the complementarity of both inductive and deductive methodology in scientific investigation. This is because it is this induction that enables scientists to predict the outcome of a scientific test. No doubt, prediction is one of the basic features of science. Prediction, which is embedded in probability, is essentially, one of the methods of induction. We can therefore conclude that inductive method cannot be totally abandoned in science. We therefore reiterate that both deductive and inductive reasoning are the basic methodologies upon which scientific research and discoveries proceed.
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